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THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
PUBLIC OFFICIAL'S LAWYER: A CASE STUDY
FROM THE CLINTON ERA
William H. Simon*
No one has sought more persistently to focus our attention on the relation
of professional duty and personal integrity than Thomas Shaffer. Shaffer's
work is the most powerful defense of integrity in the legal ethics literature, and it
offers the most useful set of strategies for vindicating integrity in law practice.
This Essay was conceived in the spirit of Shaffer's distinctive preoccupations
and commitments, and it is a pleasure to present it in an issue dedicated to
him.
When Bernard Nussbaum was forced to resign as White House
Counsel in March 1994, he described himself as a martyr to profes-
sional ethics.' He blamed the pressure for his resignation on people
"who do not understand, nor wish to understand the role and obliga-
tions of a lawyer." 2 According to Nussbaum, the point that eluded his
critics was that the duties of lawyers for public officials are the same as
those of lawyers for private citizens. "All lawyers, whether they are
White House lawyers, or private lawyers, or Justice Department law-
yers, are bound by the same ethical obligations," he said.3
I want to assess this claim by exploring two important features of
the role of counsel for public officials that bear on ethical appraisal.
The first arises from the fact that a public official client occupies an
* Stephen and Barbara Friedman, Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia
University; Gertrude and William Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford University. I
gave a version of this Essay as the Blank Lecture at Pace University School of Law on
October 11, 2001. Thanks to David Cohen, Steve Goldberg, and the Pace faculty for
encouragement and stimulating discussion.
1 See Text of [Nussbaum's] Resignation Letter and Clinton Reply, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1994, § 1, at 23.
2 Id.
3 Investigation of Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters: Hearings
Before the Spec. Comm. To Investigate WhitewaterDev. Corp. and Related Matters of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 1203 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of Bernard Nussbaum, White House Counsel). Nussbaum testi-
fied on August 9 and 10, 1995.
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institutional role entailing public duties that potentially conflict with
her individual interests. The second feature arises from the fact that a
public official sometimes has a selfish interest in avoiding responsibil-
ity for her decisions and sometimes finds lawyers distinctly useful for
this purpose.
To be sure, neither condition is unique to public clients. Many
private clients are organizations, and lawyers who represent them
must distinguish between the organizational client and the officers
with whom they deal directly. And these officers may be inclined to
shift responsibility for difficult decisions to lawyers. But the relatively
higher visibility of public decisions and the political nature of the
processes through which these officials are accountable make the fre-
quency and intensity of these issues greater in the public sphere.
Whether we call these distinctions matters of kind or of degree, they
are worth considering. Insensitivity to them can lead to missing the
ethical stakes in public representation.
This danger is illustrated by one of the episodes that led to Nuss-
baum's resignation-his response to the FBI's request to search the
office of White House Associate Counsel Vincent Foster after Foster
was found shot to death in a Washington park. Nussbaum's decision
was disputed by Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann 4 and was
then the subject of a hearing before the Senate Whitewater Commit-
tee.5 At the hearing, Nussbaum argued that his conduct was com-
pelled by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code). 6
He invoked the Model Code in reverential tones and at one point
waved a copy of it before the Committee.7 In fact, Nussbaum's argu-
ments were both wrong and inconsistent with the conduct he was try-
ing to defend. No one noticed; even the hostile Republicans on the
committee failed to bring out these failings. Yet, the failings were fun-
damental and bore significantly on the issues of Presidential accounta-
bility with which the Committee was concerned. Exploring them will
give substance to the claim that there are differences in public repre-
sentation worth bearing in mind.
4 Id. at 762 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann, Former Deputy Attorney General).
5 Id. at 4 (opening statement of Chairman Alfonse M. D'Amato).
6 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
7 See Hearings, supra note 3, at 1207 (testimony of Nussbaum); see also infra notes
73-74 and accompanying text.
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I. THE SEARCH OF VINCENT FoSTER'S OFFICE
On July 20, 1993, Vincent Foster was found dead in a Washington
park, apparently killed by the gun that was found lying next to him.8
Foster was Deputy White House Counsel and a longtime personal
friend of both President Clinton and Hillary Clinton.9 Because of the
location of the body, the Park Police undertook to investigate, and
asked permission to search Foster's office in the White House to look
for "a suicide note ... an extortion note . .. or some other such
document."10 As White House Counsel, Nussbaum phoned Deputy
Attorney General Philip Heymann to ask the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to coordinate the investigation." Heymann designated two
DOJ lawyers to do so.12 Nussbaum agreed to meet the lawyers in Fos-
ter's office the following day.13
When the DOJ lawyers arrived on June 22, to their surprise Nuss-
baum declined to allow them to examine any documents in Foster's
office. 14 They had thought that Nussbaum had agreed previously with
Heymann on a procedure that would permit limited examination: the
DOJ lawyers would inspect the first page of each document, put aside
any documents that seemed relevant to the investigation, and after
Nussbaum had had an opportunity to consider whether to assert any
kind of privilege with respect to the documents, would examine all
except those as to which privilege had been asserted. 15 However,
Nussbaum declined to follow this procedure.16 Instead, he insisted
that only he examine the documents; as he did so, he would describe
to the DOJ lawyers the nature of the documents as they appeared
from the first page or so, and would put aside any documents the DOJ
lawyers requested.17
The DOJ lawyers were sufficiently disturbed by Nussbaum's posi-
tion that they phoned Heymann, who then spoke to Nussbaum and
told him that, in a phrase that was later widely reported, he was mak-
8 The factual account is based on Nussbaum's and Heymann's testimony at the
hearings before the Senate Whitewater Committee. See Hearings, supra note 3, at
762-831 (testimony of Heymann); id. at 1201-400 (testimony of Nussbaum).
9 Id. at 3 (opening statement of Chairman D'Amato).
10 Id. at 1231 (testimony of Nussbaum).
11 Id. at 1215 (testimony of Nussbaum).
12 Id. at 766 (testimony of Heymann).
13 Id. at 1206 (testimony of Nussbaum).
14 Id. at 768-69 (testimony of Heymann).
15 Id. at 767-68 (testimony of Heymann).
16 Id. at 769 (testimony of Heymann).
17 Id. at 1236, 1248 (testimony of Nussbaum).
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ing "a terrible mistake."' 8 Heymann was under the impression that
Nussbaum had agreed to reconsider and would phone him before go-
ing ahead; he intended to order his lawyers not to participate in the
search if Nussbaum remained adamant. 19 Nussbaum, not sharing this
interpretation, proceeded to examine and describe the documents
himself as he had proposed, to Heymann's subsequent surprise and
annoyance.20
Nussbaum characterized his approach as a "middle ground" be-
tween the one the DOJ wanted and the one urged on him by some
White House staffers, who thought that the DOJ should be given no
access to any documents until they first had been fully inventoried by
White House lawyers. 21 During the course of the search, the DOJ law-
yers identified several documents as potentially relevant to their inves-
tigation 22 and, after a brief delay, all of them were turned over.23
As Heymann subsequently explained it, the concern that
prompted his proposal for more active DOJ participation in the
search was this:
The federal law enforcement authorities have a responsibility to as-
sure a process that credibly promises objectivity, when high officials
are part of the investigation. To keep this promise of objectivity,
even in a case that showed all the early signs of being a suicide, the
White House counsel could not be the one to decide what docu-
ments would be shown to the investigators and which would be re-
tained or distributed as irrelevant to the investigation or as
privileged despite potential usefulness to the investigation. 24
Referring to his experience as a Watergate prosecutor and in
other investigations of executive branch officials, Heymann suggested
that White House personnel were likely either to have, or to be per-
18 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, White House Counsel Faulted in Inquiy on Aide's Sui-
cide, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al; Stephen Labaton, Former Presidential Counsel Cast
as Whitewater's Heavy, N.Y. TiMES, July 31, 1995, at Al; TimothyJ. McNulty, White House
Warned on Foster Probe; Investigation Curbs 'A Terrible Mistake,' Ex-Justice Aide Says, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 3, 1995, § 1, at 12; Susan Schmidt, Lawyer Says Hillary Clinton Urged Search
Limit; Whitewater Panel Is Told of Concern About Access to Foster's Papers, WASH. POsT, July
23, 1995, at A4. The Hearing testimony indicates that Heymann was paraphrasing his
own words. Heymann testified, "Please don't assume that what I now paraphrase
would be the words I actually used. This is 740 days ago and it would be quite unrelia-
ble to thing they're the exact words." Hearings, supra note 3, at 769.
19 Hearings, supra note 3, at 769 (testimony of Heymann).
20 Id. at 770 (testimony of Heymann).
21 Id. at 1207-08 (testimony of Nussbaum).
22 Id. at 1208.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 763 (testimony of Heymann). Heymann testified on August 2, 1995. Id.
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ceived to have, a bias in favor of confidentiality interests at the ex-
pense of law enforcement interests.25 Thus, a procedure in which
only White House insiders looked at the documents and in which in-
vestigators were dependent on an insider's characterization of the
documents would have less "credibility" than one in which investiga-
tors were more active. Nussbaum's procedure, he thought, was more
likely to leave doubts that relevant documents may have been with-
held because they reflected unfavorably on the President.26
The DOJ ultimately concluded that Foster's death was a suicide
and that there was no indication that it was a consequence of illegal
activity such as extortion.27 Today, no one in the mainstream disputes
this conclusion, and those who do dispute it would not have been
reassured if Heymann's proposed procedure had been accepted. In
the short run, however, Nussbaum's refusal contributed strikingly to
concerns about the "credibility" of the investigations. These concerns
were intensified by three subsequent developments.
First, a few days after the initial search, another White House law-
yer discovered an apparent suicide note in the briefcase in Foster's
office. 28 Nussbaum had looked in the briefcase in his initial search
but had missed the note.29 Nussbaum's failure delayed the discovery
of the note and, at least temporarily, raised questions about the note's
authenticity.
Second, in the months following Foster's death, the Clintons' in-
vestment in an Arkansas real estate project known as Whitewater,
which was under investigation by the banking authorities at the time
of Foster's death, became headline news. There was a file on White-
water, as well as others on the Clinton's personal finances, among
those in Foster's office.30 Nussbaum testified that he was not aware of
Whitewater at the time (though apparently he had been sent a memo
about it by Treasury Department official Robert Altman) .31 Moreover,
Heymann testified that the DOJ lawyers did not have Whitewater in
mind.32 Nevertheless, once Whitewater became a prominent issue,
25 See id. at 762-63.
26 See id. at 763, 781 (testimony of Heymann).
27 See Michael Tackett & Mitcehll Locin, Clinton Counsel's Final Note Blasts D.C.,
CHI. TmB., Aug. 11, 1993, § 1, at 1.
28 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1211 (testimony of Nussbaum).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1209 (testimony of Nussbaum).
31 See, e.g., William Safire, Foster's Ghost, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A21.
32 See Hearings, supra note 3, at 786 (testimony of Heymann).
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speculation that Nussbaum was trying to preclude access to inculpa-
tory material on this subject became rife.33
Third, following the initial examination, Nussbaum turned over
the files from Foster's office that he deemed to concern the Clintons'
personal affairs to Maggie Williams, the First Lady's chief of staff, for
transmittal to the Clintons' personal lawyers at Williams & Connolly.3 4
Some of these files-pertaining to Hillary Clinton's work at the Rose
law firm-were later sought by the Senate Whitewater Committee, but
turned out to be lost.3 5 The files were later found in the White
House, but their temporary loss fueled suspicions about a cover-up. 36
This aftermath of confusion and suspicion, culminating in Nuss-
baum's resignation and the Senate inquiry into the search, seems a
stunning vindication of Heymann's concern that the "credibility" of
the investigation would be compromised if Nussbaum insisted on con-
trolling the search. To be sure, some part of Heymann's prophecy
may have been self-fulfilling. Public concerns were probably aroused
simply by virtue of the fact that an important federal official suggested
Nussbaum's procedure was a mistake, and perhaps executed in a per-
emptory and devious manner.
But Heymann's basic point was plausible. In balancing the inter-
est in executive confidentiality against the need for law enforcement
information, White House insiders are likely to be biased in favor of
confidentiality. They are naturally focused on protecting the Presi-
dent and tend to be suspicious of career government officials. Nuss-
baum's avowed preoccupation with protecting the President's
confidences to the same extent as a private client might seem to con-
firm Heymann's point.
Nussbaum, however, refused to concede that there would have
been any plausibility to public intuition that DOJ lawyers would be less
likely to shortchange law enforcement interests or overweigh execu-
tive confidentiality ones than White House lawyers:
That notion is foreign to our system of civil and criminal justice. It
is contrary to how our system functions.
All lawyers, whether they are White House lawyers, private lawyers,
or Justice Department lawyers, are bound by the same ethical obli-
gations. No one of us stands on a higher pedestal than the other.
33 See, e.g., id. at 1202, 1204 (testimony of Nussbaum) (denying widespread
suspicion).
34 Id. at 1210.
35 See Stephen Labaton, Senate Committee Says Files on Whitewater Are Missing, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at Al.
36 See Stephen Labaton, Elusive Papers of Law Firm Are Found at White House, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1996, at 1.
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No one of us is more or less of a player with a stake than the other.
No one of us is more or less deserving of trust than the other. In
our system of justice, tens of thousands of lawyers each day act as
referees under strict ethical rules when it comes to reviewing and
producing documents. This is how our system functions.3 7
The latter point was a reference to the lawyer's role in responding to
subpoenas or civil discovery requests for documents. When investiga-
tors or an adverse party properly demand production of documents
from the client, the lawyer is responsible for identifying and produc-
ing the documents.38
Nussbaum's response here was both implausible and beside the
point. It was implausible to the extent that it claimed that profes-
sional responsibility norms are incompatible with the idea that law-
yers' judgments are likely to be biased in favor of their clients'
interests. Far from denying this point, professional responsibility doc-
trine insists on it and has elaborated a whole body of "conflict of inter-
est" norms around it. The rules limit the lawyer's ability to make
commitments to multiple people with differing interests because they
assume lawyers will have a natural and appropriate tendency to iden-
tify strongly with a client's interests. If lawyers are charged with pro-
ducing documents properly demanded from their clients, it is not
because we think their judgments are just as adequate to protect the
interests of the discovering party as that party's own lawyer. It is be-
cause any other procedure would jeopardize the client's privacy inter-
est in materials he had no obligation to turn over.
Nussbaum's argument "was beside the point because Heymann
had framed his point in terms of political, not professional, responsi-
bility. He recognized that the investigators had no basis for a sub-
poena or a search warrant. On the other hand, he also assumed that
the White House had some public responsibility to cooperate in an
investigation of Foster's death and that this responsibility would be
enforced by political pressures. His proposal was designed to increase
popular confidence in the process.
Treated as a claim about popular perception, Heymann's point
was both patently plausible and substantiated by subsequent events.
Unable to deny this fact in the midst of a hearing, the very existence
of which confirmed it, Nussbaum sought to re-frame the issue as a
matter of professional ethics. I turn now to two issues that arise when
we frame the matter this way: first, the distinction between Nuss-
baum's institutional client and the individual incumbents; and sec-
37 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1203 (testimony of Nussbaum).
38 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
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ond, the allocation of responsibility between lawyer and client for
making decisions about the representation.
II. INCUMBENT AND INSTITUTION
"It was my duty to preserve the right of the White House... to
assert executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and work product
privilege," Nussbaum said, explaining his refusal to conduct the
search in the manner proposed by the DOJ.3 9 He made no further
mention of the work product privilege and never referred to any liti-
gation-related materials in Foster's office that might have qualified for
that privilege. (It seems doubtful that Whitewater was thought of as a
litigation matter at this time; in any event, Nussbaum was clear that he
was not thinking about it at all. 40 ) With respect to executive privilege,
Nussbaum mentioned that files from the FBI background investiga-
tions of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer in connection with
their nominations to the Supreme Court were in Foster's office.41 He
also suggested, without elaboration, that there might be "national se-
curity" materials there.42 These sound like plausible candidates for
executive privilege, but they do not seem a strong basis for Nuss-
baum's opposition to the search. Many DOJ people had already par-
ticipated in the background checks, and it seems implausible that any
national security materials in the White House counsel's office would
be so sensitive that disclosure to the DOJ would involve a serious risk.
However, the most important point is that, even assuming there
were materials protected by executive privilege, the search proposed
by Heymann was not much of a threat to their confidentiality. The
DOJ lawyers asked only to examine documents sufficiently to deter-
mine their general nature, and it should not have taken more than a
cursory look to identify and exclude the kind of materials that Nuss-
baum mentioned. Allowing the investigators a cursory look would not
have affected the ability to assert executive privilege with respect to
these materials later. No one suggests that executive privilege is inad-
vertently waived by limited voluntary disclosure.
There is, however, such an inadvertent waiver doctrine with re-
spect to the attorney-client privilege, and Nussbaum's defense de-
pended largely on that privilege and that doctrine.43 Evidence law
holds that voluntary disclosure of part of a protected communication
39 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1202 (testimony of Nussbaum).
40 See id. at 1204 (testimony of Nussbaum).
41 Id. at 1202, 1206 (testimony of Nussbaum).
42 Id. at 1206.
43 See WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 503.40, 511.04[5] (2d ed. 2001).
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to a third party (someone not covered by the privilege) can waive the
privilege with respect to the entire communication. 44 Nussbaum spe-
cifically mentioned three types of materials in Foster's office as to
which the most plausible privilege claim would have been attorney-
client privilege. There were files concerning the President and First
Lady's income taxes, compliance with public official financial disclo-
sure laws, and Whitewater. 45
When Nussbaum raised the waiver concern on July 22, Heymann
suggested that the DOJ and the White House could moot the issue by
stipulating that no privileges had been waived by the search. 46 Nuss-
baum told the Senate Committee that Heymann's suggestion showed
a naivet6 that reflected his insufficient exposure to private practice.
"Any lawyer in private practice knows that agreements [about wavier]
will not stand up," he said.47 Nussbaum's point about waiver agree-
ments was substantial, 48 but in retrospect it appears that his own pri-
vate practice orientation had blinded him to a much larger issue-
whether and to what extent a federal official has any attorney-client
privilege that can be asserted against the DOJ.
In fact, it now seems clear that there was nothing to waive. In two
Whitewater-related cases decided after the incident over Foster's pa-
pers, the Eighth and D.C. Circuits held that White House officials had
no attorney-client privilege against a federal prosecutor's grand jury
subpoena.49 Indeed, the subpoena in the Eighth Circuit case reached
notes of White House lawyers' conversations with Hillary Clinton
about Foster's death.50 The circuit court opinions differ, and they are
controversial, but their holdings are supported by powerfud logic.
Nussbaum's largest mistake was not to assume that confidentiality
was as important in the public as in the private realm, but to ignore
that we protect confidentiality even in the private sphere in a very
limited way. "[T]he guarantee of privacy encourages people... to be
open and honest with their advisors... ensur[ing] that clients get the
legal counsel they need to solve their problems and obey the law," said
44 Id.
45 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1209 (testimony of Nussbaum).
46 See id. at 793 (testimony of Heymann).
47 Id. at 1233 (testimony of Nussbaum).
48 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1427-28 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that voluntary disclosure to a third party waives the
attorney-client privilege even if the third party agrees not to disclose the
communications).
49 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105 (1997).
50 Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 914.
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Nussbaum. 51 But in the private sphere clients are often organizations,
and organizations consult lawyers through agents who typically have
no privilege themselves and no expectation of confidentiality vis-a-vis
their principals. The organizational client's privilege belongs to the
organization, not the agents. 52 This means that when agents disclose
to the organization's lawyers past or contemplated wrongdoing in
which they are personally implicated, they cannot be assured either
that the information will not be disclosed to others in the organiza-
tion or that the organization will not disclose it to outsiders, including
prosecutors. Although we tend to think of this situation as an excep-
tion to the general rule of strict confidentiality, in business practice,
where most clients are organizations, it is really strict confidentiality
that is the exception.
Now the limitation of confidentiality in the organizational con-
text represents an uncompromising repudiation of the conventional
rationales for confidentiality. If confidentiality really deterred unlaw-
ful conduct and increased the vindication of valid claims, it would be
in the interest of both the organizational client and larger society to
treat disclosures of an organization's agents to its lawyers as privileged
as against the organization, as well as outsiders. But we quite emphati-
cally do not do that.
Why not? I am unaware of any articulated explanation. I cannot
exclude the possibility that the incentives of individuals hypothesized
by the conventional rationales might operate differently in the organi-
zational than in the individual context, but it seems unlikely. I think a
more plausible explanation is that confidentiality sometimes requires
lawyers to remain passive in the face of serious harm or injustice and
that this condition is more tolerable when the harm or injustice be-
falls a stranger rather than when it befalls the client. Lawyers who
support strong confidentiality norms tend to view loyalty to clients as
the most important value underlying the lawyering role. To apply the
confidentiality norm in ways that preclude lawyers from protecting the
client would be personally degrading to the lawyer and corrosive of
the sense of pride in the role that motivates ethical behavior generally.
No doubt the denial of confidentiality to the agent discourages
some communications, and, perhaps, this reduces the ability of law-
yers to prevent lawlessness, but competing policies favor denying a
51 Bernard W. Nussbaum, The Role of a White House Lauyer, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995,
at 2.
52 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980) ("A lawyer employed
or retained by a corporation . . . owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a...
person connected with the entity.").
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privilege to the agent. The most important competing policy is loyalty
to the institution. It would corrode the lawyer's fiduciary position to
require her to remain silent while in possession of knowledge of im-
portance to the client.
Thus, the key point was that Nussbaum's client was an institution.
But the question remains: what institution? Nussbaum's answer to the
Senate Committee was clear. He conceded that he did not personally
represent Bill Clinton. Rather, Nussbaum said, he represented the
"President in his official capacity."5 3 This view implied that the DOJ
was a separate institution, a stranger to this attorney-client relation
and that the attorney-client privilege should be available against it.
Since the Presidency is a one-officer institution, the answer also has
the troubling implication that the President has to be the judge in his
own case. In theory, he would have to decide whether it is compatible
with the public institutional interests of the government or nation to
assert the privilege in a situation where he had a personal interest in
asserting it.
But the circuit courts took Nussbaum's client to be the "Executive
Branch." 54 The Constitution creates a single executive branch under
the control of the President. The DOJ may be a distinct administra-
tive unit, but for law enforcement purposes, it is not separate from the
Presidency. If the DOJ is not separate, the President has no attorney-
client privilege that can be asserted against the DOJ.
If we look beyond formal considerations to functional considera-
tions, the question arises whether it is compatible with the constitu-
tional idea of a single executive to permit a DOJ official -to seek
information over the objection of the President or his lawyer. The
answer seems to be yes. Although not everyone is happy about it,55
the Supreme Court has often upheld measures fragmenting executive
power.56 The two cases involving special or Independent Counsel-
United States v. Nixon57 and Morrison v. Olson58-exemplify the practice
53 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1253-56 (testimony of Nussbaum).
54 This is clear in the Eighth Circuit opinion and implicit in the opinion from the
D.C. Circuit. For an interpretation of the opinions and a compelling argument for
their holdings, see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's At-
torney-Client Privilege? , 83 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1998).
55 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the fragmentation of Executive Power).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Morrison, 487 U.S. 654.
57 418 U.S. 683.
58 487 U.S. 654; see also Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Control ofAdministrative Action:
The Exceptions, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 587, 589-99 (1976) (discussing the statutory and
judicial sources of subordinate independence). Whether the Supreme Court's ac-
ceptance of executive fragmentation is consistent with constitutional text or original
2002] lOO9
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with respect to federal law enforcement activity. Limitations on the
President's control have most .often arisen through imposition by
Congress. Thus, Morrison upheld provisions of the independent coun-
sel statute permitting judicial appointment of an independent counsel
with extensive immunity from control by the rest of the executive
branch.59 Congress has also mandated that all federal employees re-
port knowledge of criminal activity by federal officials to the Attorney
General, a provision understood to apply to federal lawyers, including
White House Counsel. 60
Another way in which limitations on the President's power can
arise is through the President's own actions. The President can limit
his power through regulation, as President Nixon did with respect to
the Watergate Special Prosecutor.61 In the Nixon case, the Court
treated the President as bound by his own regulation permitting the
prosecutor to seek enforcement of subpoenas against other executive
officers.
62
Constitutional doctrine thus portrays a single, but moderately
fragmented, executive. There are limitations on the President's pow-
ers to control his subordinates in many areas, and law enforcement is
one of the areas in which such limitations have traditionally been
most prominent.63 Nevertheless, the limitations often leave the Presi-
dent with a good deal of control; they attenuate rather than eliminate
his power. The President can exercise control through general regu-
intent is hotly debated. Compare Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing in the affirmative), with
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws,
104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994) (arguing in the negative).
59 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673-77, 685-96.
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 535 (1994); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th
Cir. 1997), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1105 (1997) (interpreting § 535 to apply to White
House Counsel).
As the House Committee Report accompanying section 535 explains, "[t] he
purpose" of the provision is to "require the reporting by the ... executive
branch to the Attorney General of information coming to their attention
concerning any alleged irregularities on the part of officers and employees
of the Government." Section 535(b) suggests that all government employ-
ees, including lawyers, are duty-bound not to withhold evidence of federal
crimes.
In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
61 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694-96.
62 Id.
63 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 14-22, 70-71, 108-10. But see Calabresi
& Prakash, supra note 58, at 558-611.
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lation. Often, he can even remove or re-assign a noncompliant offi-
cial. What he most often lacks is a power to direct'specific action.6
The President's indirect powers of regulation and removal will
usually be enough to accomplish any purpose he might have, even
where he cannot direct action. Nevertheless, the limitation arguably
serves a purpose. It requires him to act in a way that is likely to attract
attention and perhaps be perceived as disruptive. As is sometimes
said, the President has to pay a "price" in this circumstance, a higher
price than he would incur if he could act by specific command. The
potential magnitude of the price can be gauged by the outcry when
President Nixon fired his first special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, and
by the fact that he never rescinded the executive regulation under
which Cox sought the White House tapes, though this might have
ended Cox's effort.65
The implication of the moderately fragmented view of the execu-
tive is that the President can preserve confidentiality of communica-
tions with White House Counsel against a federal investigation, but
only by the costly, salient exercise of removal power against the investi-
gator, rather than through the low-cost exercise of attorney-client
privilege.
This resolution may be a plausible compromise. The limits on
the privilege may inhibit the official's willingness to seek legal advice.
But if confidentiality is sufficiently important, the President can ob-
tain it by paying the "price" of public visibility. This arguably contrib-
utes to some public accountability without entirely abrogating
confidentiality. It seems undesirable to let the President assert confi-
dentiality without cost in a situation where he may have a strong indi-
vidual conflict of interest with respect to the decision whether
disclosure is in the public interest.66
64 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); Zamir, supra note 58, at
601-19. On the extent to which the federal "whistleblower" statute limits executive
power to dismiss or re-assign lawyers for breaches of confidence or other recalci-
trance, see Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Gov-
ernment Lawyer, 5 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 306-15 (1991).
65 BARRY SUSSMAN, THE GREAT COVERUP: NIXON AND THE SCANDAL OF WATERGATE
274-77 (1974).
66 The President can also get strong confidentiality by consulting a private lawyer.
With respect to matters such as tax returns and financial disclosure, this confidential-
ity seems entirely appropriate, and as a result of the Nussbaum episode, Presidents are
likely to restrict consultations over personal matters to private counsel. To the extent
that limited confidentiality in the public sphere induced officials to seek only private
legal advice about public matters, there would be a substantial public concern. Private
lawyers may be less qualified to advise on public matters than public lawyers, and the
public would not get the benefit of the limitations on confidentiality in the public
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There is a further functional concern raised by confidentiality. A
key purpose of confidentiality in the organizational context is to en-
courage organizations to monitor their agents. 6 7 The rationale for
confidentiality in the individual context focuses on the person who
fears that conduct in which he has engaged or plans to engage may be
illegal. Without some assurance of confidentiality, she will not consult
a lawyer. The organizational context, however, also involves people
who have no such fears about themselves but may have them about
their subordinates. They will be less inclined to investigate such mat-
ters if the information will be available for use by outsiders against the
corporation. Thus, the organizational attorney-client privilege en-
courages such people to have lawyers investigate possible wrongdoing
by insiders.
In our context, there is a trade-off. Treating the White House as
a client might increase the willingness of the President to investigate
internal wrongdoing. On the other hand, it impedes the ability of the
DOJ to do so. Thus, how we delineate the privilege might be influ-
enced by which agency we think would be more effective at such inves-
tigation. My guess is that most people would think that the DOJ
would be more effective. The White House is not equipped for much
investigation of any kind. There was never any question that it would
conduct the investigation of Foster's death. And when it comes to the
type of investigation most relevant to the privilege doctrine-investi-
gation of internal abuses-history does not encourage much confi-
dence in the ability and willingness of the White House to investigate
such matters.
After the circuit court decisions, the situation appears thus: fed-
eral officials have no attorney-client privilege that can be asserted
against federal investigators with respect to consultations with govern-
ment lawyers. The federal government as a whole has an attorney-
client privilege that can be asserted against non-federal litigants.
PaulaJones, for example, could not have deposed Nusssbaum in her
lawsuit on his legal consultations with the President. In the case of the
President, and perhaps other officials with authority over the investi-
gating officials, confidentiality can be preserved through control over
the investigators, ultimately by re-assignment or removal. But the lat-
sphere. However, it seems unlikely that this danger is great. Officials have a duty to
seek legal advice over many matters, and their failure to seek it from the public lawyer
with direct responsibility to provide it would itself send a signal that often would be
costly.
67 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
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ter entails moves that are likely to be perceived as dramatic and
disruptive.
Thus, the government lawyer does resemble the private lawyer,
but the private institutional lawyer, not the private lawyer for an indi-
vidual. This distinction means that the duty of loyalty often requires a
judgment, not just about client interests but about client identity. In
particular, it requires an assessment of the incumbent's position
,ithin the structure of authority and responsibility. The lawyer has to
consider, for example, whether a particular course of action that is
open to the organization as a whole is within the authority of the in-
cumbent and will sometimes have to insist that the incumbent seek
authorization from superior constituents. Nussbaum's client was the
highest authority in the executive branch; but even here, the failure to
consider the client's position in the authority structure led Nussbaum
to over-estimate the degree of confidentiality that his client could
claim. To be sure, the limitations on government attorney-client privi-
lege were less clear in 1993 than they are now, but it seems likely that
Nussbaum's failure to appreciate the institutional dimension of his
representation biased his consideration of this issue.68
Office also entails responsibility, and responsibility bears on the
scope of advice an officer should receive. This connection suggests
that confidentiality was not the only interest relevant to White House
Counsel's duties. The concerns urged by Heymann that public confi-
dence might be enhanced by loosening White House control over this
phase of the investigation were interests shared by Nussbaum's institu-
tional client.
There is, moreover, a sense in which the public official client
might be considered different, for professional responsibility pur-
poses, from even the private institutional client. The principle of
moderate fragmentation in the executive branch has no clear counter
part in private organizations. Power is often fragmented in private
organizations, especially large ones, but this is primarily to take ac-
count of the interests of diverse constituencies. In an organization
with a single homogeneous constituency-say, a one-person business
68 Stephen Gillers's claim that "[e]verything Mrs. Clinton learned as a Yale law
student more than two decades ago would have assured her that the lawyer-client
privilege protected" her conversations with White House lawyers from discovery by
the Independent Counsel was preposterous. Stephen Gillers, Hillary Clinton Loses Her
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, § 4, at 15. It appears from the Eighth Circuit opinion
that the First Lady's lawyers were able to cite only two cases in support of her position,
both from lower courts and decided after she graduated from law school. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105 (1997).
But the principles that underlie the denial of privilege are longstanding.
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corporation-a unitary governance structure would present no
problem.
But the executive branch is fragmented, not for the benefit of its
internal constituents, but for that of the public. Moderate fragmenta-
tion is a check against the dangers of internally consolidated power. It
is designed to facilitate political accountability. Thus, the natural ten-
dency of the lawyer to identify the institution with the incumbent is
more dangerous here.6 9
III. LAWYER AND CLIENT
We have seen that Nussbaum's invocation of the lawyer's duty to a
private individual client was a mistake. 70 But there is a further prob-
lem. For even if we assume that the private individual standard was
the applicable one, that standard is not consistent with Nussbaum's
conduct.
What did the private individual standard require? Nussbaum re-
peatedly asserted without qualification that lawyers have a duty to pro-
tect the confidentiality of client information. 71 However, this could
not possibly mean that lawyers should always assert whatever confiden-
tiality rights clients have. Nussbaum acknowledged that it is often in
clients' interests to waive confidentiality rights and then refined his
claim to assert that the lawyer's duty is never to waive confidentiality
without a "prior review" by the lawyer of the materials in question.7 2
For the most part, Nussbaum treated this proposition as self-evi-
dent, but at one revealing point he attempted to invoke authority for
it. He cited Ethical Consideration (EC) 4-6 of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which refers to confidentiality concerns on
the death of a client:
I was acting as a lawyer should act after a colleague dies in the pos-
session of a client's personal papers.
69 The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility supports this point indirectly.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTy EC 7-9 (1980). Although Nussbaum re-
peatedly referred to the Code as support for his theory that public and private lawyers
have the same duties, the Code's only explicit references to public lawyers suggest
different responsibilities. EC 7-13 says that the public prosecutor's role "differs from
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." Id. EC 7-
13. EC 7-14 emphasizes the duty of a "government lawyer" to avoiding making "un-
fair" claims. Id. EC 7-14.
70 See supra Part II.
71 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 1203, 1207, 1211, 1233 (testimony of
Nussbaum).
72 See id. at 1203, 1252-53 (testimony of Nussbaum).
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When a client dies, and the rules talk about this, ethical considera-
don 4.6 of the New York State Code of Professional Responsibility
talks about this. It says, after a client dies, excuse me, after a lawyer
dies, it's the obligation of other lawyers to see to it that a client's
confidence is still protected and his personal papers should basi-
cally be sent to the client or to a new lawyer. All I was doing was
acting according to the rules that apply to all lawyers, whether they
are personal lawyers or Government lawyers.73
Nussbaum's description of EC 4-6 is questionable. Directing that
client papers be delivered to another lawyer is only one of three exam-
ples given of ways to handle the problem. More importantly, Nuss-
baum did not mention the concluding sentence of EC 4-6: "In
determining the method of disposition, the instructions and wishes of the
client should be a dominant consideration.'74
What were the instructions and wishes of the client? Nussbaum
made it clear that he got no instructions from his clients and made his
own judgment about what their wishes were. 75 Not only did he not
claim the Clintons told him to insist on confidentiality, he went to
great lengths to deny that they did so. He specifically said that he did
not speak to the President or First Lady about the matter.7 6 The hos-
tile Republicans on the Committee, far more interested in establish-
ing that the Clintons were anxious about Whitewater materials than
exploring Nussbaum's compliance with professional responsibility
norms, pressed him to acknowledge that various White House insiders
had conveyed to him that the First Lady was concerned about confi-
dentiality, but he insisted that this was not the case.
It was not part of any of the interlocutors' agendas to examine
Nussbaum about why he never asked the clients, but from the perspec-
tive of professional responsibility doctrine, this is a question of inter-
est. There seem to be four answers worth considering.
First, perhaps Nussbaum did not ask because he did not have suf-
ficient access to his clients to bring the matter to their attention in
time. This seems unlikely, however. Nussbaum emphasized his close
relation with the First Lady and indicated they spoke frequently. He
saw the President in the White House residence the day after he
learned of Foster's death, and again in the White House Counsel's
73 Id. at 1256 (testimony of Nussbaum).
74 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSiBLr EC 4-6 (emphasis added). This Ethical
Consideration speaks, not of the duty of a lawyer "after a colleague dies," but of the
duty of a lawyer to make arrangements for the protection of client papers after his
own death. Id.
75 See Hearings, supra note 3, at 1206-07 (testimony of Nussbaum).
76 Id. at 1207.
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office the following day-the day before the first discussion with Hey-
mann.77 When Nussbaum finally found the suicide note, he was able
to bring it to the President's attention right away.78
Second, Nussbaum offered an interesting characterization of the
First Lady's motivations in the course of denying that he had spoken
to her about the matter. "I assume[d] from the outset of this trag-
edy," he said, "that the First Lady, who's a very good lawyer, like every
other good lawyer in or out of the White House, would believe that
permitting unfettered access to a lawyer's office is not proper."79 Hav-
ing sought to define his responsibilities as a government lawyer in
terms of the norms applicable to a private lawyer, Nussbaum here
seeks to define the First Lady's interests as a client in terms of her
status as a lawyer. But if we take EC 4-6 seriously, this is circular since
the rule for lawyers refers back to the client's decision. According to
EC 4-6, a good lawyer does not insist on any particular position with
regard to confidentiality; she simply looks to the instructions and
wishes of the client.80
Third, perhaps Nussbaum did not ask the clients because it is
generally pointless for lawyers to ask because any client would find
Heymann's proposal unacceptable. Nussbaum implied as much more
than once during his testimony.81 In fact, however, the claim is
wrong, for reasons that were illustrated in an exchange with Senator
Shelby:
SHELBY: Why didn't you say [to] Mr. Heymann, come on down and
we'll look this over together?
NUSSBAUM: Senator, did you trust the Justice Department?
SHELBY: On stuff like that, I certainly would.
NUSSBAUM: Would you let them into your office, your counsel's
office, to look at your personal stuff?
SHELBY: Absolutely. I have nothing to hide. They can come to-
morrow or today.82
Of course, talk is cheap when the question is hypothetical, as it
was for Senator Shelby. But we need make no judgment about the
Senator's candor to see that there is an important point here. There
77 Id. at 1204-05 (testimony of Nussbaum).
78 Id. at 1205-06, 1211, 1271 (testimony of Nussbaum).
79 Id. at 1207 (testimony of Nussbaum).
80 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1980).
81 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 1210, 1224, 1233, 1251-52 (testimony of
Nussbaum) (indicating that public examination of personal, privileged material
would be unreasonable to anyone).
82 Id. at 1253 (testimony of Nussbaum) (emphasis added).
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are usually costs to the assertion of confidentiality-in particular, the
inference that a person on whose behalf confidentiality is asserted has
something "to hide," and the foregone opportunity to demonstrate by
waiving the privilege that one has "nothing to hide." The suspicion
that fueled the very hearing where Nussbaum was testifying was evi-
dence of the costs of asserting corifidentiality. A client confident that
she has nothing to hide often has a strong interest in demonstrating
that fact. And when the client is a public official, there will sometimes
be an important public value in demonstrating that nothing of public
significance is being concealed. This, of course, was Heymann's
point.
Nussbaum suffered from a common lawyer bias. Lawyers prize
confidentiality because it is a benefit that they can offer but that most
other occupations cannot. They speak of it sanctimoniously because it
(sometimes) requires altruistic dedication on their part. But it does
not follow from these facts that confidentiality is routinely more im-
portant to clients than other competing values or that there is anything
noble, from the client's perspective, about invoking it.
So we are left only one other'explanation for Nussbaum's failure
to consult his clients: he did not ask them because he thought that
their preference would be to protect confidentiality without having to
take responsibility for doing so. Here we can profit from a political insight
of Shakespeare. It appears in Antony and Cleopatra, after the death of
Julius Caesar, where the four most prominent contenders to succeed
him are gathered on the barge of one of them, Pompey, in the
Medeterranean.83 Pompey's lieutenant Menas draws him aside and
whispers that if Pompey would but tell him to do so he would slay the
other three and put Pompey in power.8 4 Pompey replies with intense
disappointment
Ah, this thou shouldst have done,
And not spoken on't! In me 'tis villainy
In thee't have been good service...
... Being done unknown,
I should have found it afterwards well done;
But must condemn it now.85
In this perspective, there is an important sense in which Nuss-
baum served his client well, but only if we assume that the client had
83 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA act 2, sc. 7.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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"something to hide," or without being aware of any specific thing, was
concerned that there might be something compromising in Foster's
files. On this assumption, Nussbaum not only minimized a threat of
disclosure but did so in a way that allowed his clients to avoid taking
responsibility for it. He made clear that he made the decision himself,
and by insisting that it was dictated by professional responsibility
norms, made it seem natural that he should do so, and implicitly (if
implausibly) denied that he did so out of fear that there might be
damaging material to be found.86
We can be fairly sure that the President did not disapprove of
Nussbaum's decision. After Lloyd Cutler and Abner Mikva served
brief stints as Nussbaum's immediate successors, Clinton appointed
Jack Quinn to the White House Counsel job.8 7 Unlike Cutler and
Mikva, who were outsiders without strong ties to Clinton, Quinn was a
member of the White House staff. In his Senate testimony, Nussbaum
had described Quinn as urging a more uncompromising position
than Nussbaum's own in response to the investigators' demands.
Quinn's advice had been that investigators should not be allowed to
see any document in Foster's office until White House lawyers had
examined and inventoried them all.88
Nussbaum was not the only lawyer to whom the Clintons sought
to shift responsibility for not cooperating with public investigations.
On other occasions, they told the press that they could not discuss
matters under investigation or make materials available because their
lawyers had told them not to, ignoring that they themselves had con-
trol over, and arguably responsibility for, the matter.89
86 In addition to the claim that "any good lawyer" would always protect privilege,
Nussbaum sought to avert the inference that he was concerned that the Clintons had
"something to hide" by suggesting that invoking the privilege was necessary to protect
the ability of future presidents to do so. He suggested that "waiver" would have acted
as a "precedent" that would impair the ability of this "and future Presidents" to pro-
tect confidential materials. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1202 (testimony of Nussbaum).
This argument is familiar. White House officials like it because it suggests that there
is often a public interest in confidentiality independent of the content of the particu-
lar materials. The argument is not very plausible, however. Waiving a privilege is
considerably different from conceding that it does not exist. Moreover, "waiver" con-
notes a discretionary act of a sort we do not usually treat as precedent. Even if it were
treated as precedent, waiver in a situation where the White House determined that
there would be no direct harm would not be precedent for waiver in a situation where
it determined there was such harm.
87 Appendix A-Digest of Other White House Announcements, 1995 11 PUB. PAPERs 1944
(Sept. 20, 1995).
88 See Hearings, supra note 3, at 1207 (testimony of Nussbaum).
89 See William Safire, Kill All the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at A25 (com-
plaining about Clinton's reliance on lawyers).
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Nussbaum's effort to relieve the President of responsibility ulti-
mately required his resignation. Like Pompey, Bill Clinton was
obliged to condemn publicly a deed of which he almost certainly pri-
vately approved. Nussbaum, to continue the classical allusion, fell on
his sword for the benefit of his political superior. This loyalty is a
familiar form of political service. It is an extreme loyalty highly valued
by many political figures. But whether it is admirable or even defensi-
ble in terms of disinterested political values or professional responsi-
bility norms is a different question.
Nussbaum did serve the President's interests but not in the man-
ner contemplated by the professional responsibility doctrine. That
doctrine purports to protect the client's autonomy, not shield the cli-
ent from responsibility for his decisions. The particular provision of
the Model Code that Nussbaum mis-invoked is consistent with the pro-
fessional responsibility doctrine in general in giving decisional author-
ity to the client. The principal exceptions involve minor tactical
decisions that do not implicate client goals and clients who are incapa-
ble of independent decision. Neither seems applicable to our
situation.90
Nevertheless, the provisions that give clients decisionmaking au-
thority are for the benefit of the client. When the client prefers not to
take responsibility, no doctrine tells the lawyer that she must force the
client to make a decision. Thus, we might ask, what is wrong with the
lawyer doing this when the interests and desires of the client would be
served by doing so? Surely there is no clear, palpable wrong of the
sort that should prompt disciplinary prohibition. But the practice
raises two sorts of concerns.
First, it seems to degrade the idea of client autonomy. A thick
conception of autonomy clearly implies not just having your way but
making choices and taking responsibility for them. A client who uses
his lawyer to evade responsibility for choice seems to mock that idea of
autonomy. The lawyer might seem to be prostituting his talents, using
them for an ignoble purpose.
Second, when the client is a political actor, there is an objection
grounded in democratic accountability. The official who gets confi-
dentiality without having to take responsibility for it, in the terms I
90 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2(a) (1983) (stating that a lawyer is
to abide by client decisions regarding "goals" and to consult the client regarding
"means"); id. P. 1.14 (stating that with a disabled client, the lawyer should maintain
.normal" relations to the extent it is feasible).
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used earlier, avoids paying the "price" for it, but values of public ac-
countability suggest that it is desirable for him to pay for it.91
Both of these concerns seem weighty enough to support criticism
of the lawyer for facilitating avoidance of responsibility by the public
official client. To be sure, it may be too much to expect lawyers to
resist the pressure they experience to do this. But we ought to be
clear about the values they jeopardize when they do so.
CONCLUSION
We have seen two senses in which the ethical responsibilities of
public lawyers are potentially different from those of private lawyers.
First, the public lawyer's client is an institution, and the institution
exists independently of the incumbent with whom the lawyer deals.
The public lawyer has to be sensitive to this distinction, and he will not
be able to define his ethical responsibilities until he has made often
difficult judgments about the identity of the client. The private insti-
tutional lawyer has this task as well, but the principles that define the
public lawyer's client are distinct and perhaps more complex.
Second, the public lawyer is more likely to experience pressure
from those who speak for the client to relieve them of responsibility
for their decisions within their authority. The ethical stakes raised by
such pressures are distinctive to the public realm. They include
norms of political responsibility and accountability that are jeopard-
ized when the lawyer relieves the incumbent of responsibility.
91 In an interesting article on our subject, Nelson Lund elaborates a hypothetical
in which the Solicitor General is considering whether the government should appeal
an adverse district court decision. The President has a strong political stake in the
decision-going one way would enhance his prospects of re-election. Lund suggests
that the lawyer should make the decision herself, weighing the political interest in the
same way she thinks the President would. Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the
Ethics of the President's Laryers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 65, 76-77.
Lund argues that the Constitution permits the President to make such a decision
himself, and that by doing it for him, the lawyer enables him to avoid the "damaging
perception of a 'politicized' litigation decision" that would result if she left the deci-
sion to the President or the Attorney General. Id. at 75.
The hypothetical is too complex for full analysis here, but, as I say in the text, the
desire to help the President avoid taking responsibility for what will be accurately
viewed as a "politicized" decision is not a consideration that can ethically be given
weight. From a moral or disinterested political point of view, such a "perception" is
entirely desirable. As support for his conclusion, Lund offers only (a) that it is the
President "alone in whom the executive power is vested by the Constitution," which
simply begs the question of the extent of "the executive power"; and (b) that it would
be difficult to frame and enforce a disciplinary prohibition of the lawyer's conduct,
which even if true, does not affect the conclusion that it would be better morally if
lawyers did not engage in it. Id. at 72-80.
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Both considerations mean that public lawyers have to be sensitive
to the distinctive kind of "price" that practices of political accountabil-
ity and responsibility often impose on political incumbents-espe-
cially in terms of public visibility-and should not seek too quickly or
unreflectively to spare officials from having to pay such prices.
